

## **Power Politics and Securitization: India's Recent Maritime Projection in Southeast Asia**

Sharifah Munirah Alatas<sup>1</sup>

National University of Malaysia, 43600 Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia

### **Abstract**

Securitization and power politics are two sides of the same coin. In the context of the analysis here, securitization refers to the transformation of regional state dynamics into matters of security. Politics is the means used to secure state ambitions to influence regional actors. India's maritime projections in Southeast Asia in the current Narendra Modi administration showcase these two concepts. India's maritime activities in Southeast Asia mainly revolve around trade as well as exploration for hydrocarbons and other deep-sea resources. However, geopolitical interests and concerns continue to shape and evolve India's Southeast Asian maritime strategy. Narendra Modi's domestic policies are designed to spur India's regional reach and influence. Both India and China see strategic significance in securing access to Southeast Asian littoral states, as seen in China's Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and India's Act East Policy. This discussion focuses on India's maritime projections in Southeast Asia, security challenges facing India in the waters of Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, and Southeast Asian states' responses to India's regional presence.

### **I. Introduction**

Securitization and power politics are two sides of the same coin. In the context of the analysis here, securitization refers to the transformation of regional state dynamics into matters of security. Power politics is the means used to secure state ambitions to influence regional actors. India's maritime projections in Southeast Asia by the current Narendra Modi administration showcases these two concepts. India's maritime activities in Southeast Asia mainly revolve around trade, as well as exploration for hydrocarbons and other deep-sea resources. However, geopolitical interests and concerns, mainly India's strategic

---

<sup>1</sup> [peanutminat@gmail.com](mailto:peanutminat@gmail.com)

ambitions, China's military assertion and associated hard and soft power configurations of other powers in the region, continue to shape and evolve India's Southeast Asian maritime strategy. Prime Minister Modi's domestic policies, namely empowering the poor, minimizing/eradicating corruption, decentralization, infrastructure development and his 'Make in India' blueprint are designed to spur India's regional reach and influence. India's maritime activities in the South China Sea and neighboring Southeast Asian waters are prompted by China's bold advances which the latter has strategically molded to by-pass reliance on the Straits of Malacca. Both India and China see strategic significance in securing access to Southeast Asian littoral states, as seen in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and India's Act East Policy. Obviously, there are a mixed bag of reactions from various Southeast Asian states.

China's global rise as one of only a handful of naval forces to contend with, began over the past two decades. During Hu Jintao's administration (2002-2012), the modernization of naval hardware, training, intelligence and other acquisitions accelerated to keep Taiwan in check. With Xi Jinping at the helm (2012 – present), China has achieved certain milestones while overhauling the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).<sup>2</sup> With China's maritime power inevitable, India needs to step-up and re-shape the contours of naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and Southeast Asia. Narendra Modi sees India's role and leadership in Southeast Asia as being challenged by China's strategic presence in the region. Beijing's naval footprint and wide network of land and port infrastructure (ports, airfields, runways, roads and railway lines) has made India determined to exert her 'India-first' foreign policy. Towards this end, Delhi's Act East strategy has set the stage for multiple geopolitical scenes in the Southeast Asian maritime theatre. The United States, India's firm supporter (and the United States's Major Defence Partner) and Beijing's irritating adversary, feels a strategic necessity to ensure that the security climate in the region remains conducive to US interests, which all boil down to economic stakes.

Southeast Asia lies at the intersection of two of the world's busiest sea-lanes. The East-West route connects the IOR with the Pacific Ocean, while the North-South route links Australia with Northeast Asia. Paramount to these connections are economic lifelines. The economies of Northeast Asia receive oil and other natural resources through these waters. They also export finished products to the rest of the world. Similarly, these sea-lanes are critical for

---

<sup>2</sup> *South China Morning Post*, July 14, 2017: "10 Chinese Military Milestones as Xi Jinping Overhauls the People's Liberation Army".

Middle-Eastern and Western economies. All commercial (and military) vessels must transit Southeast Asia, namely the Straits of Malacca, the Lombok Straits and the Sunda Straits if they are to transit between the IOR and the Pacific Ocean. It is strategically logical, then, that India, China and the United States have high security stakes in Southeast Asia. Each has an ambition to control the sea-lanes and prevent the rise of contentious regional powers, in order to ensure that shipping routes remain open and stable.

Southeast Asian states are equally calculative. With a combined population of about 600 million, low-cost, labor-intensive manufacturing and an abundance of natural resources (petroleum, natural gas, cement and uranium), these maritime states are eager for investment to fuel their rapid development (Stratfor Worldview, 2010). Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, for instance, welcome Indian, Chinese and American investment because they generate local employment. However, given the recent negative economic developments in ASEAN, Southeast Asian states have become shrewd in their investment plans. The following are some of the difficulties facing a few Southeast Asian nations. Indonesia's economic reforms have hit a snag due to non-performing infrastructure promises. The Malaysian ringgit has fallen to its lowest level against the United States dollar since 1998. This is due to falls in China's stock market (which depress commodity prices), the rise in United States interest rates and allegations of corruption engulfing Prime Minister Najib Razak. Singapore's stock market is experiencing fallout from the sharp decline in Chinese equities, which has badly affected the manufacturing and property sectors. Overall, for Southeast Asian nations, it is in their interests to ensure regional maritime security, but not without some skillful geopolitical maneuvering. In order to prevent either China or India from assuming a hegemonic role in the region, the Southeast Asian states will either balance, bandwagon or hedge their way towards maintaining a conducive security environment. A. M. Murphy suggests that, "small states.....prefer a strategic environment characterized by great power equilibrium, since this affords them the greatest freedom to pursue a policy of neutrality between them. In the absence of great power conflict, small states can reap the benefits of good relations with all major states, making equilibrium the safest environment for them" (Murphy, 2017; see also Roy, 2005).

Given this scenario, India's increased and determined maritime strategic involvement in Southeast Asia is crucial. With China and the United States as constant and persistent regional players, Delhi must manipulate the geopolitical climate for her own interests. How she does this will be detailed in sections III and IV, below.

## II. Power Configurations in Maritime Southeast Asia

India's primary strategic naval interests in Southeast Asia are drilling for, and the import of oil and liquid natural gas (LNG). After all, in 1941, the United States embargo on oil imports to Japan precipitated the war with Japan in World War II. Lest history repeats itself, India needs to safeguard her access to the transportation of these raw materials, both from Southeast Asia, and the Middle East and Africa. However, under the Modi administration, India wants to reduce crude imports by 10%, by 2022. To meet these requirements, she has to increase production from her own ageing oilfields. Nevertheless, for the time being, India is still dependent on oil imports from Southeast Asia, mainly Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei (Singh and Chakraborty, 2017). Besides this, India trades extensively with the region, contributes to connectivity infrastructure and partakes in widespread fishing activities in Southeast Asian waters. It is logical, therefore, that India's Modi consistently re-iterates his position on "the freedom of navigation" in the ASEAN-China-India (ACI) region.

Geopolitical trends and power configurations in Southeast Asia are largely influenced by, first, tensions in the United States-China relationship, second, Sino-Indian border conflicts, and third, maritime disputes in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea (Ott and Ngo, 2014). For decades, the United States has been the principal security provider for Southeast Asia with few competitors. For instance, as early as just after World War II, the Philippines and Thailand allowed the United States to monitor communist guerrilla forces in Indo-China which they did by establishing major facilities at Subic Bay (the Philippines) and Thai-United States military cooperation in the form of Chulachomklao Military Academy which is modelled on the United States Military Academy at West Point (Jackson and Mungkandi, 1986).

Southeast Asian balance of power is still evolving. One platform on which the defense community is able to discuss defense diplomacy and other related matters is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which was established just after the end of the Cold War, in 1994. To date, there are 27 member nations, including the United States, China and India. At the recently-concluded 50th ARF meeting in Manila (August, 2017), heated discussions took place about North Korea's missile tests (North Korea is a member of the ARF) and the South China Sea disputes. However, non-traditional security threats, such as cybercrime, terrorism/violent extremism, human trafficking, drug trafficking, the proliferation and use

of chemical weapons and natural disasters took center stage.<sup>3</sup> The Delhi Dialogue is another regional platform where ACI security issues are debated. It is organized by the Ministry of External Affairs (India), in collaboration with the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). The Delhi Dialogue came to fruition in 2009, and at the latest meeting in July 2017, regional geopolitics claimed much attention. Speakers unanimously agreed that both India and ASEAN must step up their efforts to contain brewing security threats in the region. The third noteworthy forum is the Shangri-La Dialogue or the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit. Held annually in Singapore, the first summit kicked-off in 2002. These three fora are significant platforms where geopolitical, strategic, security and geo-economic matters are discussed at a Track One/ministerial level. However, there is concern that such fora have proven ineffective in finding solutions to regional security tensions. No policy decisions are ever made. Having said that, participating nations are able to 'insinuate', 'influence', 'hint at' and 'suggest' behavior patterns of adversaries. Nations are also in a position to project their own geo-strategic interests.

In maritime Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, there are three explicit geopolitical strategies at play. The current United States objective is to contain China's boisterous hegemonic tendencies in light of the BRI, the nine-dash demarcation and the One China Policy. In order to do this, the United States needs to preserve its network of allies to balance China. Pivotal to this containment is to maintain a free flow of trade and commerce. Michael Auslin, in a statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, reiterated this when he said, "Imagine the damage to US markets and US consumers if cargo ships bound for ports in Los Angeles, Oakland, and Seattle were stopped transiting the South China Sea. While not likely in the immediate future, it is time for US strategists and policymakers to understand the attendant risks of allowing a competitor (in this case [China]) to dominate crucial waterways in Asia" (Auslin, 2017). India has a new outward-looking maritime strategy. Modi wants to reshape the contours of India's role as a naval power in Southeast Asia and the IOR, but given China's strategic naval presence and a wide network of infrastructural development in Southeast Asia's littoral states, India has stepped up her friendship with the United States. This is evidenced by Modi's recent visit to Washington, where Trump 'promoted' India to a Major Defense

---

<sup>3</sup> Non-traditional Security Threats Take Center Stage in Meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Senior Officials. [www.asean2017.ph](http://www.asean2017.ph), May 2017.

Partner. It grants India preferential access to American defense technology. Also, Modi's Act East Policy (2014) and the India-first foreign policy are the current foundations of India's designs in Southeast Asia. Both policies aim to protect India's strategic interests while ensuring robust economic growth. Geopolitically, these policies accord India a new focus to promote connectivity through Myanmar and Thailand with other ASEAN nations. Modi is determined to engage United States and China, which is a reversal of India's previous inward-looking stance. It now has an intensive naval engagement with the United States navy, demonstrating India's shift from being a 'lone ranger'. India has also committed to helping smaller states in Southeast Asia to build up their maritime capabilities. For instance, after the INS Airavat was challenged by the Chinese navy in September 2012 en route to Vietnam, India has since stepped up maritime cooperation and interoperability with the Vietnamese. China has the capability to launch disabling attacks on any ship or carrier groups in maritime Southeast Asia. She has:

1. land-based ballistic and cruise missiles;
2. modern jets with anti-ship missiles;
3. conventional and nuclear submarines;
4. long-range radars and surveillance satellites;
5. cyber and space weapons intended to blind any force; and
6. the capability to launch a maneuverable warhead onto the deck of an aircraft carrier 2700 km out at sea.

With such hard power, China seems to have a hegemonic strategy to ensure maritime security along the key sea lanes of communication (SLOC) in Southeast Asia. China's 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (part of the BRI) is a bold strategy emphasizing the construction of ports, port cooperation and land-water transportation channels. This massive infrastructure development ensures China dominance of the ACI region.

It is clear that there are three major powers that are predominant forces in Southeast Asian waters. All three have strategic and geopolitical interests, mainly to preserve the balance of power, rather than triggering further escalation of conflict, but also to engage Southeast Asian nations militarily and economically with zero-sum gains.

### **III. Acting East: India's Strategic Maneuvers in Southeast Asia**

India's Act East, Neighborhood First and India First policies are the driving forces behind Modi's leveraging of China. It is evidence of India's determination not to be a pawn in

China's game of chess, in the "grand Chinese enterprise". Also, her growing economy creates rising demands for raw materials. This in turn requires India to have greater access to supply markets facilitated by inter-state trade. Trade necessitates a free flow of goods via maritime and overland transportation. The greatest bulk of traded goods transits the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) via ships and tankers which need an uninhibited passage through the oceans. With Modi at the helm, India is determined to dominate the SLOC between maritime Southeast Asia, the Bay of Bengal and the western Indian Ocean. Furthermore, Southeast Asian states prefer a balance of power in the ACI region, and welcome India as a 'swing state' (Mohan, 2013). When Prime Minister Modi took office in May 2014, he set out a course for Indian foreign policy which closely-addressed Delhi's strategic interests in the IOR and Southeast Asia. There is a certain intensity with which India sees herself in the geo-strategic sphere within the ACI region. Not being a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Group of Seven (G7), as well as her exclusion from permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council are substantial reasons for India to tighten her influence over Southeast Asia. This is embodied in Modi's three-pronged strategy.

First, he has set the course for closer ties with the United States and her allies, Japan and Australia. Shortly after assuming office, Modi approved the Defence Framework Agreement in 2015 and the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016, and embarked on a partnership to build India's next generation aircraft carrier. Second, the Neighborhood First foreign policy of Modi is designed to enhance India's Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) within the Indian Ocean, manifest in development projects and military aid to the IOR island states of the Seychelles, Mauritius and the Maldives. Additionally, Modi has made efforts to improve bi-lateral ties with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. For example, the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) between Bangladesh and India was ratified in 2015, which allowed for the exchange of land parcels that have been in contention since the partition of India, 1947. This was much-appreciated by the Sheikh Hasina government (Subramaniam, 2015). The Sri Lankan government under Ranil Wickremesinghe thawed relations with India. His declaration to pacify the discontented Tamil minority at home has given Modi the opportunity to consolidate trade and defense ties with Sri Lanka, without stirring emotions on Indian soil. Third, India under Modi wants to defend her maritime interests due to the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean in

global politics. As part of internal balancing, Modi has embarked on an ambitious plan to modernize and acquire force projection capabilities including naval fighter aircraft and Boeing P8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft. In recent years, India has emerged as the largest weapons importer in the world and buys in significant numbers from the United States, Russia, France and Israel. Currently, she is also close to acquiring the Japanese amphibious aircraft US-2 Shin Maywa (Mukherjee, 2017).

Modi's three-pronged strategy has enhanced India as a net security provider in Southeast Asia. From April 19-27, 2017, the INS Karmuk along with a Dornier maritime patrol aircraft participated in the twenty-second Indo-Thai Coordinated Patrol (CORPAT) in the Andaman Sea. CORPAT has been underway since 2005, taking place biannually to ensure the safety of international trade and shipping lines. The twenty-second CORPAT had a clear focus on search and rescue at sea and preventing unlawful activities, furthering India's regional net security provider agenda. India has also extended naval cooperation with Thailand in other areas, such as the training of Thai navy and coast guard personnel. For this purpose, the Indian naval ships Tir and Sujata, and the sail-training ship Sudarshini, along with the Indian Coast Guard's Varuna, were deployed to Phuket, Thailand, as part of an overseas deployment. India and Indonesia also partake in joint maritime exercises. Both countries are working to secure twin threats to commercial shipping and international trade in the ACI region, besides improving interoperability. A strategically-significant aspect of the Indo-Indonesian CORPAT exercises is that Port Blair in the Andaman Sea was chosen as the venue, underscoring the high priority accorded to the maritime dimension in Modi's eastward-oriented foreign policy. This projection has also been complemented by unprecedented multilateral diplomacy with the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus). Between March 2-8, 2017, India hosted a multinational field training exercise Force 18, comprising the eight dialogue partners of the ADMM Plus. On May 18, 2017, India sent four ships of the Indian Navy's Eastern Fleet for a two-and-a-half-month operational deployment to the South China Sea and the North Western Pacific.

#### **IV. Is India Welcome? Southeast Asian Littoral States' Responses**

Southeast Asia has had relations with India for centuries. Trade between India's coastal kingdoms of Orissa and Southern India, and Thailand, Malaysia and Cambodia are well-documented. India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru mentioned the economic and strategic relevance of the region and India's role in it (Mukherjee, 2017). In 1947, he invited

leaders from Vietnam, Indonesia and Myanmar to the first Asian Conference in Delhi, who later endorsed Nehru's Pan-Asian vision and his thrust on decolonization and economic cooperation. Hence, India is no stranger in Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asian states manage the risks and uncertainties of China's rise and India's security build-up by engaging the United States, China and India. While diplomatic, economic and security relations continue between the United States and all littoral Southeast Asian nations, many of the latter have also engaged both India and China, economically and strategically, thus maintaining a delicate balance. They do not fear any major security threat from either China or India. There is no one-sided fear of China's growing maritime presence and welcome India's regional security influence. Southeast Asian states hedge, seeking to maximize economic gain from both China and India.<sup>4</sup> This alignment behavior seems contradictory, in the sense that it maximizes economic returns on the one hand, but invites security risks on the other. However, in reality, hedging allows for a combination of economic and political engagement, with risk management. Not all Southeast Asian nations hedge in the same manner. There are variations, but they share a pattern of not overtly choosing sides. Among the Southeast Asian nations, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are clear hedgers. They have military-to-military ties with India without having treaty alliances or ideological allegiances. They welcome India's security presence in the ACI region as an insurance policy against other-power aggression (*e.g.* United States-China, or India-China aggression). Below are examples of a few Southeast Asian nations and their military relations with India.

Malaysia and India have mutual strategic interests in the Andaman Sea and the Straits of Malacca. As a result, interactions between the two navies are intense. The two countries share common weapons systems, and Malaysia has been seeking training assistance from India for the equipment. For example, India trained Malaysian military personnel on the operation of the SU-30MKM, a two-seater fighter aircraft developed by Russia's Sukhoi Aviation Corporation.

It is similar for Indonesia. In May 2017, the Indian naval ships, INS Sahyadri and Kamorta visited Jakarta, and in June, proceeded to Surabaya under the India-Indonesia Coordinated

---

<sup>4</sup> The term 'hedging' is an alternative to balancing and bandwagoning in describing small-state strategy towards a rising power (Kuik, 2016). It is when a small state adopts a middle position, seeking to capitalize on the dynamics of the rising power in order to reap as much economic and diplomatic profits as possible from that power.

Patrol (CORPAT) maritime exercise. This underscores a steady growth of defense relations between Indonesia and India in Southeast Asian waters.

Recently Vietnam has been courting India in the defense realm. Vietnam sees this as a deterrent against China who has laid claim to islands in the South China Sea off the coast of Vietnam. Vietnam, aware that India has the world's fourth-strongest armed forces, purchases weapons and receives naval training from India. Trung Nguyen, international relations dean at Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences and Humanities says that India has offered Vietnam credit to buy weapons and trains Vietnamese sailors.

Southeast Asian nations see eye-to-eye with India's principled stand on the freedom of navigation issue in the ACI region. They also welcome India's efforts to bolster each of their maritime capabilities. Calculated steps have been taken by these states to maintain a regional balance of power by hedging between India and China, as a security insurance in order to maximize economic benefits.

#### **V. Conclusions: India's Fait Accompli and Security in Southeast Asia**

India is pursuing several undertakings beyond her borders. Modi's Act East policy, in particular, aims to strengthen ties with ASEAN and the wider ACI region through new projects that will provide India's landlocked northeast with better access to Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam. Also, India is aware of the inevitability of threats to commercial and military shipping, given China's show of muscle guised in the form of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (as embodied in the BRI). Modi's 2014 election mantra for a 'New India' still resonates today. In a recent speech addressing the electorate at the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) headquarters in Delhi, Modi said "the strength of the poor and aspirations of the middle class can take India to new heights". He also reiterated that, "if we are successful, no one can stop India from becoming a world power". While not all quarters of the Indian electorate may support Modi's microeconomic and other domestic reforms, they do share his passion for an active and dominant global strategic and security agenda. India sees this as a fait accompli, having no other option but to participate as a contending force amidst rising regional powers. For India, as in most other cases, development and security issues are interconnected. Modi's fierce economic reforms compel India to reach out for raw materials, but amidst a challenging security environment, Delhi must strengthen her security engagements in the Southeast Asian region.

In conclusion, it is appropriate to re-visit the concept of securitization. It emerged in the writings of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde of the Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI) in Copenhagen over a span of ten years, beginning in 1995 (Buzan *et al.*, 1998). They analyzed how an issue is either a “threat” or is being “threatened”. Within this framework, actors declare a referent object a threat. Actors are generally political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups. Referent objects are the state, national economies, collective identities and species and habitats. The need for India to project her maritime strength in Southeast is due to several securitized issues, namely:

- i. sustainable economic growth of India, China and the Southeast Asian nations;
- ii. economic stakes/boundaries (the ACI region); and
- iii. power configurations.

These three securitized issues constitute economic, geopolitical and military security, respectively.

The securitization model allows us to ask five pertinent questions, so that real and perceived threats can be avoided. First, who are the securitizing actors in Southeast Asia, through the speech act? Second, who or what is to be protected (which referent object)? Third, what are the specific threats from which the referent object needs to be protected? Fourth, who decides on what is a security issue? Fifth, by what means should the threat be dealt with? Keeping these questions in mind could minimize geopolitical challenges, in order to achieve the ultimate goals of sharing our oceans, freedom of navigation and peaceful economic activities transiting our seas.

### References

- Auslin, M. (2017) Securing ‘Asia’s Mediterranean’. *American Enterprise Institute*  
<http://www.aei.org/publication/securing-asias-mediterranean/>
- Bateman, S., Chan, J. and Graham, E. (2011) *ASEAN and the Indian Ocean: The key maritime links*. RSIS Monograph No. 33.
- Bhagawati, J. (2017) Duterte’s Foreign Policy Shift: Bandwagoning with China? *National Maritime Foundation*.  
<http://www.maritimeindia.org/View%20Profile/636443176054500355.pdf>
- Bhattacharya, A. (2013) India’s Growing Soft Power in Southeast Asia: Will it Clash with China? <http://www.ipcs.org/focusthemesel.php?articleNo=4070>
- Buzan, B., Jaap, D.W., and Ole, W. (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Chand, B. and Garcia, Z., 2017. Power Politics and Securitization: The Emerging Indo-Japanese Nexus in Southeast Asia. *Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies* 4, 310-324.
- De, P. (2014) *India’s Emerging Connectivity with Southeast Asia: Progress and Prospects*. Asian Development Bank Institute Working Paper 507.

- Ermito, D. (2017) India and China Struggle for Maritime Supremacy. <https://raddingtonreport.com/india-china-struggle-maritime-supremacy/>
- European Parliament Think Tank (2017) Challenges to Freedom of the Seas and Maritime Rivalry in Asia. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EXPO\\_IDA\(2017\)578014](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EXPO_IDA(2017)578014)
- Horváth, C.B. (2017) China's Rise and the Geopolitics of Southeast Asia. *Defence Review - The Central Journal of the Hungarian Defence Forces* [https://honvedelem.hu/files/files/64874/hsz\\_20171\\_226\\_240\\_angol.pdf](https://honvedelem.hu/files/files/64874/hsz_20171_226_240_angol.pdf)
- Jackson, K. D., and Mungkandi, W. (1986) *United States-Thailand Relations*. University of California, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies.
- Jash, A. (2017) China's 'Blue Partnership' through the Maritime Silk Road. <http://www.maritimeindia.org/View%20Profile/636416427545411647.pdf>
- Kuik, C. (2016) How do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN States' Alignment Behavior Towards China. *Journal of Contemporary China* **25**, 500-514.
- Kurlantzick, J. (2012) ASEAN's Future and Asian Integration. *Council on Foreign Relations* [https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2012/10/IIGG\\_WorkingPaper10\\_Kurlantzick.pdf](https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2012/10/IIGG_WorkingPaper10_Kurlantzick.pdf)
- Izuyama, M. and Kurita, M. (2017) Security in the Indian Ocean Region: Regional Responses to China's Growing Influence. *East Asian Strategic Review*. [http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2017/east-asian\\_e2017\\_02.pdf](http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2017/east-asian_e2017_02.pdf)
- Majumdar, M. (2017) BRI: Implications for Southeast Asia. <http://theasiadialogue.com/2017/09/15/bri-implications-for-southeast-asia/>.
- Mohan, C. (2013) *Emerging Geopolitical Trends and Security in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the People's Republic of China and India (ACI) Region*. Asian Development Bank Institute Working Paper Series, No. 412.
- Mukherjee, A. (2017) Indian Ocean Region Strategic Outlook. In S. Bateman, J. Chan and E. Graham (eds.) *ASEAN and the Indian Ocean: The key maritime links*. RSIS Monograph No. 33.
- Murphy, A.M. (2017) Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages. *Asian Security* **13**, 165-182.
- Oba, M. (2017) Challenges for ASEAN as it turns 50. *The Diplomat*. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/challenges-for-asean-as-it-turns-50/>
- Ott, M., and Ngo, K. (2014) An Emergent US Security Strategy in Southeast Asia". *Asia Pacific Bulletin* No. 248.
- Pardesi, M.S. (2017) *American Global Primacy and the Rise of India*. East-West Center: AsiaPacific Issues No. 129.
- Rafiq, A. (2017) China's \$62 Billion Bet on Pakistan. *Foreign Affairs*. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-10-24/chinas-62-billion-bet-pakistan>
- Roy, D. (2005) Southeast Asia and China: balancing or bandwagoning? *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* **27**, 305-322.
- Singh, R. (2017) China's Connectivity Strategy in Southeast Asia. *Science, Technology and Security Forum*. <http://stsfor.org/content/chinas-connectivity-strategy-southeast-asia>
- Singh, R.K., and Chakraborty, D. (2017) India Can't Drill Solo to Meet Oil Supply Goals, Says Wood Mac. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-11/india-can-t-drill-solo-to-meet-oil-supply-goals-woodmac-says>
- Stratfor Worldview (2010) U.S., China: Conflicting Interests in Southeast Asia. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/us-china-conflicting-interests-southeast-asia>

Power Politics and Securitization: India's Recent Maritime Projection

Subramaniam, N. (2015) Something Gained in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, A Lot Lost in Nepal. *The Indian Express*, December 28.

Tellis, A. (2017) Are India-Pakistan Peace Talks Worth a Damn?

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/09/20/are-india-pakistan-peace-talks-worth-damn-pub-73145>

Wagner, D. (2018) India's Political Influence in Asia.

[https://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/indias-political-influenc\\_b\\_6884358.html](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/indias-political-influenc_b_6884358.html)